

COMMENTS ON "A REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY"

1. The Review raises, on behalf of the President, a valid basis for examining the intelligence community, with the objectives of improving the overall quality of intelligence products and reducing the community's size and cost. While there may be differences of opinion as to the causes of, and solutions to, the problems the Review describes, it is worth our most serious consideration to see what we can do to bring about the desired improvements.

2. The principal thrust of the Review deals with resource control and management, and it is here that the most significant improvements can be made. The law, Presidential letters, and other directives have been silent as to the role the Director of Central Intelligence was to play in resource management. Lacking clear direction toward a stronger position regarding resource requirements and allocation, the evaluation of their effectiveness, the selection of new systems, and the phasing out of the old, the Director has had little basis to balance his coordinating authority over substance with a comparable authority over resources.

The Review quite properly recognizes that nearly [redacted] percent of the total resources are funded and controlled by the Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense must therefore be very heavily involved in any changes directed toward improvement in resource management and control.

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3. The Secretary of Defense has made a good beginning in making the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration also responsible for coordinating intelligence. In his posture statement of 9 March 1971, the Secretary of Defense recommended the creation of a second Deputy Secretary and two additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense to enhance civilian supervisory management of the Department. An Assistant Secretary devoting his full time to Department of Defense intelligence activities and reporting to one of the two Deputy Secretaries would seem to be a considerable improvement over the present arrangement. This is probably enough legislation to ask for at this time. In fact, the kind of legislation which would be required under either Option I or II of the Review could well lead to a wrangle in the Congress which might in the end emasculate the intelligence effort. There are other drawbacks to Options I and II, but these alone are enough to rule them out as realistic solutions. And the Review itself seems to recognize that Option III has enough built-in problems to minimize its chances of being very effective. It follows that some variant of these three Options which could be accomplished under existing Presidential authority and without legislation, offers the greatest hope of accomplishing the President's objectives.

4. Given the wide deployment of resources, disparate interests, and jurisdictional boundaries within the community, it is very doubtful

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that the Director of Central Intelligence can command the entire community. He should, however, under an appropriate mandate be able to coordinate it effectively.

5. If the President desires that the DCI coordinate the resources of the intelligence community, this could be done through a Presidential or National Security Council directive to the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. Such a directive would as a minimum need to provide for DCI coordination of programs, budget preparation, and final review before submission to the President. It would also need to provide for continuous program review and coordination of budget administration. Results would depend in large part on the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and, more importantly, on strong Presidential support.

6. The product will never be as good as we would like it to be. It should, however, be as good as we can make it. The Review deal, with the possibility of separating production units of CIA from the collectors in order to ensure objectivity. This would be a great mistake. It is administratively quite simple to ensure that the collector is not also the evaluator of the information he collects. The fact that the production components usually have collateral from other, and sometimes several, sources also minimizes this risk. In any case, to disembody the Central

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Intelligence Agency and leave the Director of Central Intelligence with -
out command of, and intimate association with, those units upon which
he must depend to support production would take away what control he
now has of the intelligence process. The resultant deterioration of the
process and the product is predictable. It simply isn't viable.

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7. Some mechanism to bring the consumer closer to the product
is much to be desired, and the Review's suggestion that this might be
done through a high-level consumer council has much to commend it.

8. If the President should direct that the Director of Central
Intelligence assume responsibility for coordinating the resources of the
intelligence community in line with the suggestion made herein, it would
be necessary for the Director to delegate more of his day-to-day manage-
ment responsibilities for the Central Intelligence Agency, which is per-
fectly feasible.

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